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Interconnections can be an effective way to increase competition in 
wholesale electricity markets in particular for smaller markets with few 
actors. This paper quantitatively examines the potentials for 
interconnections in the Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM). We use a 
time-varying Kalman filter technique to assess the degree of market 
integration between SEM and other large, mature and interconnected 
wholesale electricity markets in Europe. The results indicate a low 
degree of market integration between SEM and other European markets 
and thereby raising the possibility to benefit from increased electricity 
trade. As wholesale prices in SEM remain relatively high and volatile; a 
larger interconnector capacity can promote competition, close the gap 
with the European wholesale prices, improve security of supply, and 
mitigate price volatility. The results indicate that wholesale spot trading 
of renewable may not increase market integration. The results suggest 
that an interconnector capacity amounting to about 21% of generation 
capacity in SEM is likely to achieve an integration coefficient of 0.86 
similar to what currently exists between the markets in Austria and the 
Netherlands.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The establishment of a competitive wholesale electricity market is a priority for many 
electricity markets in Europe. The drive towards a competitive and common internal 
market for electricity has led to the creation of organized wholesale spot markets 
(power exchanges) and increased cross-border wholesale electricity trade across many 
European countries. While the European Union’s Directive 2003/54/EC requires the 
member states to open the market and guarantee non-discriminatory network access to 
third-parties; the EU Directive 2009/72/EC places wider emphasis on cross border-
interconnections and the need to mitigate barriers to cross-border trade to meet its 
energy policy goals and targets of sustainability, affordability and security of supply. 
 
Coinciding with the overall policy changes in the EU; the Northern Ireland Authority 
for Utility Regulation (NAIRU) and the Commissions for Energy Regulation (CER) 
have since November 1, 2007 started jointly regulating the all-island Single 
Electricity Market (SEM) encompassing both Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. SEM as all-island small electricity market encompasses approximately 2.5 
million electricity customers, 1.8 million in the Republic of Ireland and 0.7 million in 
Northern Ireland. As a centralised gross mandatory pool, all electricity in SEM is 
traded through a market clearing mechanism based on the generators bidding their 
Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC) and receiving the System Marginal Price (SMP)1 . 
                                                 
Acknowledgement: The authors would like to gratefully thank the Northern Ireland Utility Regulator of 
Electricity, Gas and Water (UREGNI) for their valuable collaboration and providing the necessary data and 
information in completing this study. We would also like to thank an anonymous referee for providing detailed 
comments in the earlier version of the paper.    
 
1 In addition, the power producers receive separate capacity payments based on available generation capacity and 
constraint payments for the difference between the market schedule and the system dispatch. Suppliers, on the 
other hand, purchase electricity from the pool by paying the SMP for each trading period along with capacity 
payments and system charges. 
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Economic theory suggests that SRMC pricing is desirable to achieve Pareto efficient 
outcomes (i.e. allocative efficiency) by optimally allocating the scarce economic 
resources at a given time (Hotelling, 1939). However, the risk of societal welfare 
losses (deadweight losses) is high in SEM due to the dominance of the wholesale 
market by two large incumbent electricity groups on the island, namely Electricity 
Supply Board (ESB) and Viridian with potential ability to exercise market power2. A 
vertically integrated market structure (between transmission and generation) can 
create every incentive and opportunity for exclusionary behavior making the 
electricity market more susceptible towards market power abuse and exercise 
(Joskow, 2003). Additionally, the combination of economic non-storability of 
electricity, low short-run elasticity of demand, high sunk costs as entry barriers, and 
short-run capacity constraints can increase the risks of strategic behaviour and market 
power exercise by the participants. Theory also suggests that the abuse of market 
power can lead to productive inefficiency implying that electricity will be under-
produced and will no longer be produced at the least possible average cost (Boiteaux, 
1965).  
 
The isolation of the island economy from continental Europe has resulted in just one 
interconnector link (the Moyle interconnector) connecting SEM with Britain 
amounting to almost 4.7% of total SEM generation capacity. The lack of an 
interconnected system can provide more opportunities for the incumbents to behave 
strategically and unilaterally profit from limited competition.  
 
Interconnections are an effective way to increase competition in wholesale electricity 
markets in particular for smaller markets with limited number of participants. An 
interconnected system is economically justifiable because it incurs lower operating 
costs by permitting excess supply in one node to be utilized in other nodes where the 
marginal cost would be higher if there were no interconnection3 (Charun and 
                                                 
2 Market power is the ability to profitably maintain prices above competitive levels by restricting output below 
competitive levels (Werden, 1996; Hogan, 1997). Vertical market power occurs when a single firm controls more 
than one component of electricity production while horizontal market power results due to the problems of 
concentration of ownership. 
3 Market coupling, for example, is a mechanism to interconnect markets with an overall aim of maximizing the 
total economic surplus of all participants involved across different power exchanges. Assuming sufficient 
transmission capacity, one exchange will export to another for as long as the marginal price offered in one is lower 
than the marginal bid price in the other, until the point that prices converge or available cross-border capacity is 
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Morande, 1997). Hence, the total economic surplus is maximized as the most 
expensive energy is displaced. Likewise, an interconnected system provides potentials 
for capital costs reductions by incurring lower investments as it may no longer 
necessitate maintaining reserve generating capacity in every node in case of system 
failures (Turvey, 2006). It can even create incentives for optimizing the size and 
timing of new investments by associating with a more efficient system (Brunekreeft 
and Newberry, 2006).  The theoretical analysis on the long run economics of 
interconnection suggests that interconnections will lead to an increase in consumer 
surplus and improved security of supply by increasing the total available capacity 
(Matsukawa and Mulder, 2004). Thus, the benefits of enhanced competition and cross 
border electricity price differences can potentially justify the economic logic of an 
interconnected market (Giesbertz and Mulder, 2008). 
 
Economic studies on the theoretical and numerical models of strategic behaviour 
further indicate that it is more costly and hence less attractive to exploit market power 
in an interconnected market (Amundsen et al. 1998; Van Damme, 2004). 
Interconnecting fossil dominated electricity systems such as SEM with hydro based 
systems could reduce price volatility and mitigate subsequent market uncertainties 
(Matsukawa and Mulder, 2004). A stable wholesale price, on the other hand, provides 
stability to the wholesale market which can further help in providing appropriate 
investment incentives and market signals to the market participants (Green, 2008). An 
interconnected market should create opportunities to benefit from economies of scale 
as market size grows resulting in lower generation costs. In the absence of market 
power, the potential efficiency gains resulting from economies of scale should lead to 
lower wholesale prices. Hence, we expect that SEM can benefit through potential 
interconnections with other EU electricity markets in terms of enhanced competition, 
improved security of supply and lower electricity prices. 
 
The aim of this paper is to primarily assess the current state of SEM and examine the 
possibilities and potentials to benefit from increased interconnections. For this 
purpose, we analyze the wholesale spot electricity price development of SEM with 
other large, mature and interconnected wholesale electricity markets in Europe using a 
                                                                                                                                            
exhausted. In the EU, the trilateral market coupling between France, Netherlands and Belgium has proven to be 
largely successful since 2006.   
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time-varying approach. We analyze the prices because they reflect all publicly 
available information while those prices instantly change to reflect new public 
information in an efficient market in line with the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
(Fama, 1970)4. As prices aggregate and reveal market information (Grossman, 1976); 
all identical goods must have only one price in an efficient (i.e. competitive and 
liquid) market (Burdett and Judd, 1883)5. Thus, an efficient market becomes fully 
integrated as ‘an entire territory of which the parts are so united by the relations of 
unrestricted commerce that prices take the same level throughout with ease and 
rapidity’ as defined by Cournot (Stigler, 1969)6. Market efficiency implies that the 
prices of homogenous products from diverse suppliers should follow same pattern 
over time in a fully integrated market.  
 
However, none of the above discussed studies on electricity markets have analyzed 
the development of wholesale price in SEM while the occurrence of negative prices in 
the European Energy Exchange (EEX)7 and SEM possibly necessitates re-visiting the 
econometric methodology used in these existing studies. Negative prices occur in 
times of high power in feed (in particular from intermittent energy sources such as 
wind) which leads to a lower intersection of the merit-order curve with the demand 
function leading to lower wholesale power prices (Nicolosi, 2010). It is further 
believed that increased trade of renewable in the wholesale market will greatly 
improve the EU electricity market integration (Joseffson, 2009).  Hence, we study the 
degree of market integration of SEM with other EU electricity markets using a 
dynamic approach to capture the subsequent effect of any structural and unobservable 
changes (such as political, economic, and regulatory) as revealed through prices over 
time. A low level of market integration would indicate the need for expanding 
                                                 
4 According to efficient market hypothesis (EMH), markets can be weakly, semi-strongly or strongly efficient in 
terms of reflecting and processing information. Weak EMH claims that prices on trade already reflect all past 
publicly available information; semi-strong EMH claims both that prices reflect all publicly available information 
and that prices instantly change to reflect new public information while strong EMH additionally claims that prices 
instantly reflect even hidden or "insider" information (Fama,1970). 
 
5 This is also a definition of the Law of One Price (LOOP) which is difficult to achieve fully in electricity markets 
due to infrastructure bottlenecks such as limited transmission capacity. The law of one price states that in 
competitive markets free of transportation costs and barriers to trade, identical goods sold in different countries 
must sell for the same price when their prices are expressed in the same currency (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003). 
See Engel and Rogers (2001) describing price convergence as the reduction in international price differentials 
while Lammont and Thaler (2003) provide some criticisms of LOOP. 
 
6 The concept of market integration was first defined by Cournot (Federico, 2007). 
 
7 The EEX allowed the possibility of energy prices in bids since September, 2008 as it closed with the negative 
prices for the first time in October, 2008. 
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interconnections in SEM and benefit from price differences in international wholesale 
electricity markets.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the relevant literature 
that analyses the wholesale electricity market integration in Europe. Section 3 
describes the data and econometric methodology used in this study. The results are 
presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with relevant policy 
recommendations. 
 
2. Review of Relevant Literature 
 
Several studies have so far empirically examined the development of wholesale 
electricity prices across different European wholesale markets for varying time 
periods using econometric techniques. Bower (2002) compared day-ahead 2001 prices 
from the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and the UK applying 
correlation and cointegration analysis. The study found some evidence of an already 
integrated market especially among the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and 
Germany by 2001.  Boisseleau (2004) used regression and correlation techniques 
based on the same dataset to determine the level of market integration and 
subsequently analyses the findings of Bower (2002). The findings indicated a low 
level of market integration among the European electricity markets. Armstrong and 
Galli (2005) examined the day-ahead price differentials between Spain, Germany, 
France and the Netherlands from 2002 to 2004 testing for price convergence. Their 
findings suggest a convergence of European electricity prices during this period.  
 
However, Armstrong and Galli ignored the cross-border capacity allocation 
mechanisms. Based on this limitation, Turvey (2006) empirically studied the use of 
interconnectors and pricing of limited transmission capacities using correlation 
analysis. His findings based on the Anglo-French interconnector indicate a low 
correlation of flows and price differentials. A recent study by Zachmann (2008) 
analyses the integration of European electricity prices by studying the development of 
wholesale prices from 2002 to 2006 and includes congestion charges accounting for 
congestion and congestion management. The findings show that although bilateral 
price convergence occurred during 2002-2006, no single European electricity market 
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exists so far. The study suggests that congestion charges cannot fully explain the low 
level of observed market integration using Kalman filter analysis.  
 
As Kalman filter can even analyze time series not integrated of the same order; it is 
widely applied in other sectors of the economy as well. For example, Kradelogiou 
(1999) applied Kalman filter to analyze the agricultural markets in Bulgaria and 
Slovenia while Prazmoski (2005) used Kalman filter to study fiscal equilibrium in the 
Dominican Republic. Similarly, Neumann et al. (2006) applied Kalman filter to study 
market integration in the European natural gas markets while King and Cuc (1996); 
Cuddington and Wang (2004) used time-varying coefficients and autoregressive 
models of price differentials to examine the convergence of natural gas spot prices in 
USA. According to Bomhoff (1992), the coefficients estimate generated by the 
Kalman filter generally outperforms the coefficient estimate generated by Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and is hence preferred to OLS. To the best of our knowledge, 
this paper is the first to study the price development of SEM with other large, mature 
and interconnected wholesale electricity markets in Europe using a state-space model 
based on the powerful recursive Kalman filter algorithm accounting for negative 
wholesale prices.   
 
3. Data and Econometric Methodology 
 
Bilateral wholesale electricity trading remains the dominant form of wholesale trade 
in some European countries8. However, electricity trade is no longer confined to over-
the-counter (OTC) trade with the establishment of power exchanges in most European 
countries. A common market design across many power exchanges is the creation of a 
spot market in which electricity is traded for each hour of the day. Prices determined 
in the spot market can contain sufficient information on available generation capacity, 
supply flexibility, electricity demand levels and demand flexibility (Ulbig, 2010). 
Analyzing day-ahead prices can also avoid the temporal aggregation problems (see 
Hamilton, 1994) associated with using lower frequency data (such as monthly, 
yearly). Thus, we examine the development of hourly intraday prices in this paper. 
 
Our dataset consists of wholesale spot prices from four countries in Continental 
Europe (Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria); Northern Europe (i.e. the 
                                                 
8 In Germany, for example, 1900 TWh of wholesale electricity was traded bilaterally in the OTC market in 2005. 
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Scandinavian countries) and the all-island Irish countries. All of these spot markets 
started operating before SEM while also being large and widely interconnected as 
shown in Table 1. Only 1% of scheduled generation in SEM was obtained via the 
interconnector in 2008 (UREGNI, 2009).  Figure one shows the scheduled generation 
mix for the first three quarters of 2009 (January-September). The fuel mix is 
dominated by gas fired generation constituting 69% followed by coal and wind at 9% 
and 7% respectively.  Spot trading of electricity in SEM is mandatory whereas other 
power exchanges represent low liquidity in comparison to SEM (especially EXAA 
and Belpex) as wholesale spot trading of electricity in these markets is voluntary 
while bulk electricity is being traded bilaterally in the OTC market.  
 
Fig 1: Scheduled generation fuel mix 
 
Source: UREGNI, 2009 
 
However, a fundamental characteristic common across all power exchanges is the 
regulatory practice of day-ahead price setting based on ‘sealed bid one-shot uniform 
price’ auctions. The market operator (i.e. the auctioneer) collects all supply and 
demand bids  while market clearing is done once per trading day separately for each 
hour (except for SEM where market clearing takes place every half-hour) and sold 
electricity is physically delivered the following day. Hence, all bidders essentially 
receive the same price (i.e. the SMP in our case) and any bidder who lowers his 
quantity offer can improve his terms of trade and the terms of trade of all winners 
(Klemperer, 2005). Despite minor differences in market structure and mechanisms, 
liquidity and products; the EXAA, EEX and APX operate in similar terms 
(Zachmann, 2008).  
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The Scandinavian market which includes Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden has 
the largest joint spot market for electrical energy in the world called NordPool Spot 
that organizes a day-ahead spot market via Elspot. A spot market share of 72% 
indicates that Elspot is highly liquid. Similarly, EEX and SEM are the only power 
exchanges in our study with negative wholesale pricing regime in place. A negative 
spot price reveals the underlying opportunity costs (for example, avoided start-up and 
shut-down costs), gives higher value to consumer flexibility and provides additional 
price signal for storage of intermittent energy sources such as wind (Geneose et al., 
2010).The possibility to trade with dual currencies in SEM makes it a unique 
organized market in the world.  
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the Power Exchanges 
  
Countries 
 
Established 
 
Currency 
Spot market 
volume in 
2009 (TWh) 
Total 
Consumption in 
2009 (TWh) 
Spot 
market 
share 
European 
Energy 
Exchange 
(EEX) 
 
Germany 
 
2002 
 
EURO 
 
203 
 
581 
 
35% 
Belgian 
Power 
Exchange 
(BELPEX) 
 
Belgium 
 
2006 
 
EURO 
 
10.1 
 
81.7 
 
12.4% 
Energy 
Exchange 
Austria 
(EXAA) 
 
Austria 
 
2002 
 
EUR0 
 
4.7 
 
62.4 
 
7.5% 
Amsterdam 
Power 
Exchange 
(APX) 
 
Netherlands 
 
1999 
 
EURO 
 
29.1 
 
122.8 
 
23.7% 
Nordpool 
Power 
Exchange 
(ELSPOT)9 
 
Scandinavia 
 
2002 
 
NOK 
 
285.5 
 
396.5 
 
72% 
Single 
Electricity 
Market 
(SEM) 
Northern 
Ireland and 
Republic of 
Ireland 
 
2007 
 
Euro and 
Pound 
Sterling 
 
34.6 
 
36.2 
 
95% 
Source: Respective spot markets website 
 
The time frame for hourly day-ahead prices ranges from 1 January 2008 to 6 January 
2011 with the total number of observations surpassing 26,000 for all markets. The 
                                                 
9 ELSPOT was registered as a separate company in 2002 after Denmark joined the pool. We do not consider the 
UK Power exchange as it is already connected to some extent to SEM via the Moyle interconnector. However, it 
would be interesting to study the effects of recent UK and the Netherlands interconnector (i.e. BritNed) on market 
outcomes in the future.   
 
EPRG No 1121 
 
 9
data was obtained from publicly available sources for SEM data which was provided 
by the utility regulator. The hourly day-ahead prices data for SEM was constructed by 
averaging the half hourly prices within each hour. The descriptive statistics for the 
logarithmic transformed prices and non-logarithmic transformed prices (i.e. the raw 
prices) are presented and discussed. 
 
Table 2 show the descriptive statistics of the logarithmic transformed day-ahead 
hourly wholesale prices across the power exchanges. Prices are logarithmic 
transformed as log prices can better reflect the underlying distribution of the residuals 
used in our model. Log transformed prices potentially mitigate the heteroscedastic 
properties of prices by minimizing the effects of high volatility and the outliers 
effects. The log wholesale prices in SEM are on average 4% higher than APX and 
Belpex; 5% higher than EEX and EXAA and 6% higher than Elspot. The heavy use of 
gas in electricity generation coupled with (or) market power could have led to 
relatively higher wholesale prices in SEM though this remains to be empirically 
examined. The log-prices in SEM also remained the least volatile after Elspot possibly 
due to the exclusion of negatives prices resulting from excess energy supply from 
intermittent sources. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (logarithmic transformed prices 2008-2011) 
 LAPX LBELPEX LEEX LELSPOT LEXAA LSEM 
 Mean  1.659  1.656  1.643  1.624  1.640  1.722 
 Median  1.672  1.679  1.663  1.632  1.663  1.714 
 Maximum  2.698  3.384  2.693  2.477  2.394  2.842 
 Minimum -2.000 -2.000 -2.000 -1.698 -2.000  0.517 
 Std. Dev.  0.253  0.289  0.263  0.153  0.302  0.203 
 Skewness -4.275 -4.172 -3.424 -1.801 -5.662  0.437 
 Kurtosis  54.572  49.846  30.376  21.379  62.675  3.565 
Observations  26206  26196  26329  26442  26061  26446 
 
However, it completely ignores the available information incorporated in the negative 
prices. This is due to the fact that log of negative prices does not exist thus leading to 
available information being omitted for EEX and SEM prices. The descriptive 
statistics obtained from Table A (see Appendix) for the raw wholesale prices (i.e. 
including the negative prices) suggest that day-ahead hourly wholesale prices were on 
average 12% higher than APX, 16% higher than EEX and 25% higher than Elspot. 
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While the Elspot prices were the least volatile of all; the prices in SEM experienced 
greater volatility of all markets. The reason could be due to more uncertainties 
associated with gas prices as well as the underlying trading uncertainty in a new, 
immature but liquid market. Figure 2 illustrates a graphical representation of the raw 
prices while Figure A in the appendix is the graphical representation of the 
logarithmic transformed day-ahead hourly wholesale prices. 
 
The figure indicates that the price series are potentially homoscedastic and mean 
stationary at levels though needs to be tested. Nonetheless, the degree of market 
integration to be examined through price convergence is not clear which the aim of 
this paper is. Moreover, changes in time-variant observed and unobserved factors such 
as fundamental market rules and regulations, new market designs and other 
institutional changes are the likely factors to change the strength of price relationships 
across markets implying that markets either move towards a greater level of 
integration or they tend to diverge from each other. Hence, the notion of market 
integration or separation can be analyzed by testing for the convergence or divergence 
of the day-ahead hourly prices across the different markets considered in this study. 
 
Figure 2: Graphical analysis of day ahead wholesale raw prices (EUR/MWh) 
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Although, cointegration analysis has been widely used to test for price convergence in 
the econometrics literature; one implicit assumption of cointegration analysis is that 
the structural relation among the prices is fixed over the considered time period. As 
mentioned in several studies including King and Cuc (1996) and Neumann et al. 
(2006); the cointegration analysis ignores the dynamics of any possible price 
convergence or divergence. Thus, considering the likely structural developments 
across all wholesale markets, the assumption of a fixed relationship between spot 
prices over time seems problematic. 
 
Hence, we use a linear state space representation in order to examine the price 
convergence using Kalman filter analysis which is based on a recursive algorithm 
(Kalman, 1960). The state space approach incorporates the state variables 
(unobserved variables) to be estimated along with the observable model. With this 
approach, the nature and path of price convergence across markets can be studied, 
explaining market integration by estimating a time-variant coefficient model. Using 
the day-ahead hourly spot prices at SEM (Market A) and other large, mature and 
interconnected markets considered in this study (Market B), the following equations 
constituting a linear relationship between the two markets can be specified: 
PA,t = αA,B + βAB,t PB,t  + εt                                                                                       (1) 
βAB, t = βAB,t-1 + θt                                                  (2) 
where ),0.(...~ 2εσε diiNt  and ),0.(...~ 2θσθ diiNt  are white noise processes.  
Equation (1) is the ‘signal’ or ‘observation’ equation while equation (2) is the ‘state’ 
or transition equation. The state equation captures the effect of unobserved variables 
and incorporates those effects to be estimated with the observed model as represented 
by the signal equation. In the above set of equations, εt and θt are normally and 
independently distributed random error terms (with zero mean and a normal variance 
σ2) while αAB captures the time-invariant factors (such as the transactions costs, 
capacity charges, etc.) between the markets A and B. The vector of unobservable 
coefficients at any time t is denoted by βAB,t which describes the price relationship 
between the two markets considered. Applying the time variant coefficient model to 
the price series (PA and PB) will enable us to identify the joint development of prices. 
It provides information on the value of state variables (αAB and βAB,t) for each point in 
time for both price series. Therefore, the Kalman filter processes the data on both 
price series in two consecutive steps. It first estimates βAB,t by using available 
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information till the period t-1. As a second step, the estimates of βAB,t are updated by 
incorporating prediction errors from the first step as information at time t is realized. 
Thus, the Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm for subsequently updating (or error 
correcting) the one-step ahead estimate of the state mean and variance given new 
information.  
 
In the process, the time variant coefficient model produces linear minimum mean 
error estimates of βAB, t using observed and available data through time t. Thus, being 
based on a specific optimization recursive algorithm it allows for the updating of the 
model estimations using newly available information (see Harvey, 1987; Hamilton, 
1994). The filter approach ensures that the corrections made in βAB,t beyond t (say t+k) 
follow a time-varying moving average process of order k-1.  
 
Hence, if A and B spot markets are perfectly integrated, the value of βAB,t  equals unity 
at any time t implying conformity towards the law of one price. On the other hand, if 
βAB,t = 0 the prices of day-ahead hourly electricity traded on both markets bear no 
relation with each other at any time t implying perfectly uncorrelated prices10. A full 
market integration indicates limited (or no) opportunity to benefit from cross border 
price differences through interconnections while a low market integration implies 
significant opportunities to benefit from differences in international electricity prices 
via cross border interconnections.   
 
4. Results and Discussions 
 
It is necessary to examine the properties and nature of those series as a pre-requisite 
for any econometric analysis of time series. Testing for unit roots is a well-established 
methodology in econometrics literature for such analysis involving time-series. 
Besides, empirical studies suggest that unit roots can also be used to test for pair-wise 
price convergence (or divergence) for price series (Aubyn, 1999; Bernard and 
Durlauf, 1996; Zachmann, 2008). However, the concept of applying unit roots to test 
for price convergence can be criticized on the grounds that the stationary property of 
price differences can mean both convergence and divergence while in the presence of 
                                                 
10 If A and B hourly day-ahead markets are fully integrated or the spot prices are in full convergence, the value of 
{lim t→infinity (PA – PB)} = αAB while the final state of convergence shall be {lim t→infinity βAB} = 1. 
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outliers unit root tests can lack power and robustness. Though, it is not our aim to 
examine market integration via unit roots test, Table 3 reports the results from unit 
root tests based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) 
and Kwiatkowski; Phillips; Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test (KPSS, 1992)11.   
 
Table 3: Unit root tests 
Electricity hourly day-ahead Prices (log)
Power Exchanges 
ADF KPSS 
Level Level 
APX -4.786*** 0.358* 
Belpex -7.607*** 0.339 
EEX -23.032*** 0.353* 
Elspot -2.253** 0.313 
EXAA -51.875*** 0.423* 
SEM -37.463*** 0.375* 
Note: Tests include a constant but no time trend. For ADF, the lag length is selected according to 
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). For KPSS, bandwidth has been chosen according to Newey-West 
using the Bartlett Kernel. The numbers provided in the table denote the t-statistics for ADF and the LM 
statistic for KPSS.  
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1%-levels 
 
The results suggest that the hourly day-ahead price series including the SEM are 
stationary at levels allowing us to assume that the first differences are also stationary 
in nature.  Since electricity cannot be stored economically with demand having little 
or no effect (i.e. inelastic demand); the stationary behavior of hourly spot prices is 
expected. However, the absence of a unit root at levels also precludes the motivation 
to test for stable long run equilibrium relating between the price series. On the other 
hand, widely used cointegration technique such as Johansen test (Johansen 1998, 
1991) assumes a constant cointegrating vector over time and thus not effectively 
allowing us to assess the development of market integration over time. The results 
from correlation analysis are economically misleading as it does not account for 
changes in the process of market integration (e.g. for short term price divergence) 
over-time. However, correlation analysis can be used to determine whether certain 
market pairs are integrated as the correlation coefficient provides a useful analysis on 
the initial level of market integration (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985). The correlation 
                                                 
11 We present the results from both unit roots test as it is argued that the power of the KPSS test is high as 
compared to ADF while the results were similar for raw price series data as well though not presented here. Also, 
double testing improves the reliability of our results. However, ADF is based upon the null hypothesis of a unit 
root; the KPSS is based upon the null hypothesis of stationarity. 
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results from Table 4 show the static notion of market integration between SEM and 
other large, mature and interconnected wholesale markets.  
 
Table 4: Correlation results for logarithmic prices 
 LAPX LBELPEX LEEX LELSPOT LEXAA LSEM 
LAPX 1.000      
LBELPEX  0.905  1.000     
LEEX  0.748  0.690  1.000    
LELSPOT  0.438  0.410  0.420  1.000   
LEXAA  0.776  0.705  0.757  0.392  1.000  
LSEM  0.619  0.562  0.538  0.304  0.562  1.000 
 
We can infer that the market integration of Elspot with other markets remains the 
lowest. SEM prices are thinly correlated with other spot markets with the price 
correlation for Elspot being the least. The lack of interconnection coupled with twin 
conditions of being a new market and differences in several institutional aspects such 
as market designs, regulatory framework, etc. can explain such low correlation. 
However, APX and Belpex markets are highly correlated as expected for reasons such 
as an already existing trilateral market coupling regime between France, Belgium and 
the Netherlands leading to increased international trade of electricity and 
harmonization of institutional framework. The correlation coefficients do not change 
much even after including the negative prices. Table B in Appendix shows the 
correlation coefficients of prices across the spot markets. The harmonization of 
market rules in terms of negative pricing regime between SEM and EEX improved the 
price correlation by around 5%. Similarly, the price correlation between EXAA and 
EEX is also high due to high cross border electricity trade and the likely adoption of 
similar other wholesale market principles. The correlation results show some signs of 
bilateral convergence of prices among different market pairs. 
 
The relatively low price correlations of SEM with other wholesale markets is 
sufficiently evident enough to indicate that significant potential exists to benefit from 
interconnections due to high differences in cross-border electricity prices. As such, 
although bilateral price convergence is possible among markets with high price 
correlations (APX-BELPEX, EEX-EXAA, APX-EXAA, etc.), the notion of a single 
European wholesale market for electricity is still far from being achieved. The 
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persistence in international electricity price differences could be due to the scarcity in 
interconnector capacity. However, a recent study by Gebhardt and Hoffler (2010) 
argues that it is rather the lack of competition, a case where well-informed traders do 
not engage in international electricity trade, rather than the presence of limited 
interconnector capacities that explains the significant difference between international 
electricity prices. Nonetheless, it requires detailed empirical investigation that is 
beyond the scope of our paper. 
 
Moreover, market integration is a dynamic process and can vary with time due to 
changes in economic and political environment in the national and international 
energy markets. Table 5 illustrates the strength of price relationship between SEM and 
other large, mature, and interconnected wholesale markets in Europe based on the 
Kalman filter using the Maximum Likelihood estimator.  
 
Table 5: Market integration coefficients based on logarithmic prices 
Method: Maximum likelihood (Marquardt) 
Sample: 1/01/2008 00:00 to 1/06/2011 23:00 
Market Pairs Final State of Market Integration 
SEM-EEX 0.12** 
SEM-APX 0.19*** 
SEM-Belpex 0.18*** 
SEM-EXAA 0.15** 
SEM-Elspot 0.16*** 
  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1%-levels 
We can infer that the current (final) state of market integration of SEM is less than 
20% with all other markets under consideration. The SEM prices are the least 
integrated with the EEX prices at 12% while integration with the APX market remains 
the highest at 19%. The market coupling between the Netherlands and Belgium imply 
that the strength of price relationship between SEM and Belpex remains at 18%. 
Similarly, the current level of market integration between the Austrian wholesale 
markets and the Nordic pool Elspot stands at 15% and 16% respectively. The low 
level of market integration between SEM and other European markets indeed provides 
strong indications to benefit from increased interconnections in the isolated SEM 
market. Hence, increasing cross border electricity trade via an interconnected system 
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can be an important measure to improve market integration between the European 
wholesale electricity markets and SEM.  
 
Although the isolation of SEM and thereby the lack of interconnection with other 
markets mostly explain the existing low level of market integration; several other 
factors are also significant. This is because market integration can be explained by a 
vector of factors such as the convergence of factor inputs (i.e. electricity) and final 
product prices; matching of institutional framework and electricity market regulation 
and the convergence of electricity consumption patterns coupled with similarity in 
generation technologies. However, the above results do not consider the incorporation 
of negative prices in wholesale market trade which is an important element of 
wholesale market design in EEX and SEEM. Thus, we also calculate the market 
integration coefficient based on the raw prices for the same market pairs as in Table 5 
to better understand the role of renewable energy sources (primarily wind) wholesale 
electricity trade on wholesale market integration. The results are presented in Table 6. 
       Table 6: Market integration coefficients based on raw prices 
Method: Maximum likelihood (Marquardt) 
Sample: 1/01/2008 00:00 to 1/06/2011 23:00 
Market Pairs Final State of Market Integration 
SEM-EEX 0.38 
SEM-APX 0.44 
SEM-Belpex 0.46 
SEM-EXAA 0.39 
SEM-Elspot 0.43 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1%-levels 
 
The results from Table 6 show a large improvement in the final state of market 
integration coefficient for all market pairs after the inclusion of negative prices. The 
availability of more market information through prices might have resulted in such 
increase. However, the results are no longer significant at (1, 5 or 10)% even though a 
higher degree of price convergence is indicated. Our results based on the existing 
dataset do not support the claims of policymakers that increasing renewable wholesale 
trade will lead to an increasingly integrated market for electricity in Europe. Negative 
prices, by definition, occur at low demand levels but high wind in-feed possibly from 
using unlimited supply bids leads to uncertainty and instability in the wholesale 
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electricity trade. Nonetheless, the hypothesis needs to be tested with longer time-
series in the future.  
 
In order to facilitate comparison and establish a benchmark case of market integration 
between SEM and other markets, we also calculated the market integration 
coefficients among the large, interconnected and mature electricity wholesale markets 
considered in this study. We considered all the market pairs with more than 90% price 
correlation as obtained from our correlation analysis. Table 7 illustrates the market 
integration coefficients between other established wholesale markets. Considering that 
interconnection currently just amounts to 4.7% of SEMs available generation 
capacity, our results also show the required level of interconnection in SEM to reach 
the integration level of other well established wholesale markets in Europe. 
 
Table 7: Market integration coefficients among selected markets (log prices) 
Method: Maximum likelihood (Marquardt) 
Sample: 1/01/2008 00:00 to 1/06/2011 23:00 
Required level of interconnection in SEM 
(as percentage of total generation capacity)  
 Market Pairs Final State of Market 
Integration 
APX-Belpex 0.77*** 20.1% 
EEX-APX 0.66*** 16.3% 
EXAA-APX 0.86*** 21.3% 
EXAA-EEX 0.62*** 24.3% 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1%-levels 
 
The market integration coefficients among the selected markets are more than 50% in 
all cases while being as high as 86% between EXAA and APX. Similarly, the strength 
of price relations between APX-Belpex, EEX-APX and EXAA-EEX stands at around 
77%, 66% and 62% respectively. A high cross-border trade of electricity via 
interconnections combined with similarity in market structure, design, and governance 
are the likely explanatory factors resulting in a high market integration coefficient 
among these markets.  
 
Based on the current level of market integration and interconnection capacity in SEM, 
we can infer that an increase to 20.1% of interconnector generation capacity from the 
current 4.7% level will raise the market integration coefficient between SEM and 
APX to 0.66 as currently exists between APX and Belpex. Ceteris paribus, this would 
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imply a cost-savings (or consumer surplus) of about 248 million euros in SEM 
assuming that hourly wholesale prices in SEM reach the existing APX levels.   
Similarly, a 16.3% of interconnection capacity as of total generation capacity will 
increase the market integration coefficient between SEM and Belpex to 0.66 as 
currently prevails between EEX and APX. Allowing the average hourly wholesale 
prices in SEM to reach the Belpex levels would generate a cost-savings of 272 million 
euros, all other things remaining constant. It is desirable that the interconnection 
amounts to 25.8% of generation capacity to attain an integration coefficient of 0.62 
between SEM and EEX as it currently exists between EXAA and EEX. This would 
generate a consumer surplus of about 333 million euros at the existing EEX price 
levels. Likewise, our results also show that a 21.3% of interconnection as a percentage 
of generation capacity will increase the market integration coefficient between SEM 
and APX to 0.86 as it currently stands between EXAA and APX. Similarly, assuming 
that average SEM wholesale prices reaches the Elspot levels with increased 
interconnections would create a welfare gain of about 514 million euros with all 
things remaining constant. 
 
It is highly unlikely that market integration coefficient will reach unity as the price 
differences between two electricity wholesale markets cannot be zero due to 
transaction costs, transmission bottlenecks and other factors. However, the integration 
coefficient moving towards unity indicates that the price differences between the 
markets are diminishing. Hence, both markets are being increasingly competitive as 
increased competition implies the reduction in the average price levels. As the average 
wholesale prices in SEM are higher than other wholesale markets in Europe; 
significant potentials for wholesale price reductions exists through increased 
interconnections. Likewise, those markets with a high level of market integration can 
still pursue interconnections for security of supply and mitigating the potentials to 
market power abuse.  
 
Thus, the proposals to expand the interconnections network through the East-West 
interconnector (Ireland-Wales) apart from the existing Ireland-Northern Ireland 
interconnector (Louth-Tandragee) and the existing 500 MW Northern Ireland-
Scotland interconnector is certainly desirable. Moreover, it is essential that SEM is 
well connected with other large, mature and interconnected wholesale markets in 
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Europe for further reduction in wholesale price levels and reduce unprecedented price 
volatility as suggested by economic theory. Experience from Elspot suggests that even 
though the region is dominated by seasonally varying hydro generation; price 
volatility is the lowest among all other wholesale markets at 14% because of increased 
cross-border trade of electricity via the power exchange (see Table A in Appendix). 
The time-varying path of the market integration coefficients between SEM and other 
markets observed in Figure A in Appendix show that the integration coefficient 
remained volatile and unstable over time and far from reaching unity which can 
primarily be attributed to various uncertainties (such as trading) and volatility 
associated with high liquidity in a newly established market. However, higher price 
volatility can be an inherent feature of a liberalized energy market where prices 
quickly adjust to market volatility and shocks.    
 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
The aim of this paper was to examine the potential of interconnections in the all-
island electricity wholesale market (SEM). A time-varying econometric technique 
based on Kalman filter algorithm was applied to determine the degree of market 
integration between SEM and other large, mature and interconnected wholesale 
electricity markets in Europe.  Our results suggest that at the current state, market 
integration of SEM with other wholesale markets around Europe is low. High market 
liquidity in SEM has not necessarily meant higher market efficiency unlike Elspsot 
where the average hourly wholesale prices are the lowest. Thus, the all-island 
wholesale market cannot be deemed competitive.   
 
Our results suggest that significant opportunities exist to close the gap between 
international price differences via increased interconnection. Reducing average hourly 
wholesale prices in SEM can engender significant welfare gains as also suggested by 
our results. Even though electricity in Ireland is mostly gas fired; increased cross-
border electricity trade can have a downward pressure on domestic electricity prices 
in the island. Apart from benefits of price differences due to growing market size and 
economies of scale, low market integration would also imply connecting to 
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international markets and benefit from increased security of supply and reduced price 
volatility as economic theory suggests.  
 
While the average wholesale prices in SEM continue to remain high as compared to 
other markets; it is desirable that focus should be directed at alternative energy 
sources to reduce the reliance on gas-firing. The transition towards a low-carbon 
economy has meant that the Irish government has targeted to achieve 33% of energy 
consumption from wind energy. However, our results based on the existing dataset 
however indicate that trading intermittent energy sources (such as wind) may not 
contribute towards market integration unless other complementary conditions such as 
storage, proper regulatory and market design framework, regulatory coordination etc. 
Although higher wholesale prices in SEM also raise the possibilities of market power 
abuse due to the presence of oligopolistic elements and lack of competition; 
interconnecting markets and increased trading of electricity on a level playing field 
(i.e. a common platform such as power exchange) can offset the problems of potential 
market power abuse and fuel competition in the wholesale market. 
 
Thus, it is desirable that the process of interconnecting SEM to larger wholesale 
markets in Europe is intensified with investments in interconnector capacity and 
transmission networks. Equally important will be the appropriate regulatory 
framework and market design that incentivizes wholesale traders to actively engage in 
cross-border electricity trade and generate adequate investments in transmission 
infrastructure.  
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Fig A: Graphical representation of log transformed day-ahead hourly prices 
 
 
 
Eur / MWh APX BELPEX EEX ELSPOT EXAA SEM 
 Mean  52.181  51.487  49.702  44.469  50.110  59.336 
 Median  47.710  47.000  45.980  42.850  46.070  51.777 
 Maximum  500.000  500.00  494.260  300.030  248.270  695.785 
 Minimum  0.010  0.010 -500.020  0.000  0.010 -26.025 
 Std. Dev.  26.223  24.522  24.452  14.907  23.406  33.846 
 Skewness  1.834  1.852  0.693  1.948  1.238  3.143 
 Kurtosis  16.791  16.438  22.751  19.017  6.202  24.855 
Observations  26172  26206  26447  26445  26061  26448 
Table A: Descriptive statistics of raw prices 
 
 
 APX BELPEX EEX ELSPOT EXAA SEM 
APX  1.000      
BELPEX  0.963  1.000     
EEX  0.883  0.855  1.000    
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ELSPOT  0.398  0.397  0.422  1.000   
EXAA  0.923  0.893  0.927  0.435  1.000  
SEM  0.588  0.560  0.564  0.275  0.602  1.000 
Table B: Correlation results of raw prices 
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Figure A: Path of market integration coefficients for logarithmic prices 
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